To gain more of an overall historic perspective on the current North Korea situation, I picked up the book: The Korean War by Mathew Ridgway. Neither side, the North (with aid from China and Russia), or the South (primarily aided by the U.S.) “won” in the traditional sense of that word. Ridgway notes that the following encompasses some of the reasoning for the U.S. not pushing harder for outright military victory during that war: “It is clear that [America’s] top civilian and military leaders, using a wider-angle lens, with deeper sources of information on the atomic situation in the Soviet Union, and with more comprehensive estimates of possible consequences of general war in Europe, had a much clearer view of the realities and responsibilities of the day. In their view, the kind of ‘victory’ sought by the Theater Commander [General MacArthur], even if it were attained in Korea, would have incurred over-balancing liabilities elsewhere.” Okay in my perspective: On an international stage, things are, indeed, often a geopolitical chess match where it is extremely wise to anticipate future moves in regard to the move you are making now. And that’s the kind of measured, thoughtful approach I’d take with North Korea, as I would take with foreign (and domestic) policy in general.